Supporting Documentation · Jan 23, 2018
57-18 Exhibit - Urging State of New Jersey to Implement Charitable Trust in Lieu of Local Taxes Plan.pdf
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e, when the donor sells or exchanges a State tax credit to a third party for consideration that an accession to wealth has occurred.” These passages reflect the same logic underlying Rev. Rul. 79-‐315 and Snyder v. Commissioner, discussed above. As Tempel confirms, when a state grants a taxpayer a tax credit, the state is not regarded as making a payment to the taxpayer or transferring an 10
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF STATE CHARITABLE TAX CREDITS item of value to the taxpayer but rather is merely exercising its sovereign power to “tax one taxpayer at a lower rate than another taxpayer.” The tax credit is simply the mechanism by which a state government decides to impose a “lesser tax detriment” on one party by virtue of its actions or attributes. The credit does not involve a reduction of a past or even existing liability but rather is one of the many variables that the state, in its sovereign capacity, has decided to take into account in determining the final amount of the taxpayer’s as yet undetermined tax liability. The second element of the Tempel holding relevant to the quid pro quo analysis is the Tax Court’s discussion of the taxpayer’s basis in the tax credits granted to them by virtue of the charitable gift. Because the taxpayers eventually sold the credits, rather than using them to reduce their own tax liability, it was necessary to determine their basis in order to calculate the amount of any gain or loss on the sale.29 Here again, the holding endorses the Full Deduction Rule in finding that the taxpayer’s basis in the charitable tax credits was zero. Recall that the value of the donated easement was $836,500 and the amount of the credits granted by Colorado was $260,000. Under a quid pro quo analysis, that transaction would be regarded as (1) a gift of property worth $576,500, and (2) a purchase of state tax credits for $260,000. That is
would be regarded as (1) a gift of property worth $576,500, and (2) a purchase of state tax credits for $260,000. That is the essence of the quid pro quo analysis—i.e., a bifurcation of the transaction into its gift and non-‐gift components. Recall that when a donor of $100 to public radio receives a tote bag worth $20, she is treated as (1) making a gift of $80, and (2) purchasing a tote bag for $20. In this situation, the donor’s basis in the tote bag is $20. Consistent with the view that the receipt of a state charitable tax credit is not a quid pro quo transaction, the Tax Court in Tempel rejected this approach, concluding instead that the taxpayers “did not acquire the State tax credits by purchase”30 and therefore they “do not have any basis in their State tax credits.” In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that “[i]t was the State’s unilateral decision to grant petitioners the State tax credits as a consequence of their compliance with certain State statutes.”31 In other words, the Tax Court’s view is that a state charitable tax credit is not regarded as consideration for the gift, but rather flows from the unilateral decision by the state government to confer a lesser tax detriment on those who make qualifying gifts of conservation easements. The Tax Court’s decision in Tempel v. Commissioner was later affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.32 Route 231, LLC v. Commissioner.33 In another case involving state charitable tax credits, the Tax Court and the Fourth Circuit
32 Route 231, LLC v. Commissioner.33 In another case involving state charitable tax credits, the Tax Court and the Fourth Circuit also touched on the question of whether such credits should be regarded as a quid pro quo. Route 231 LLC v. Commissioner involved a limited 29 26 U.S.C. Sec. 1001(a). 30 136 T.C. 341, 353. 31 Id. (emphasis added). 32 744 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 2014) (consolidated appeal of Tempel v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 341 (2011) and Esgar Corporation v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2012-‐35 (2012)). 33 T.C. Memo 2014-‐30; aff’d is 810 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 2016) 11
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF STATE CHARITABLE TAX CREDITS liability company formed in 2005 by Raymond Humiston and John D. Carr for the purpose of acquiring and operating certain real property in Albemarle County, Virginia. The LLC acquired real property (Castle Hill and Walnut Mountain) in June 2005. Carr and Humiston then engaged a consultant to determine whether and how to devote some portion of the property to conservation purposes. As a result of these deliberations, on December 27, 2005 the parties amended the LLC’s operating agreement to admit a new member, Virginia Conservation Tax Credit FD LLLP (“Virginia Conservation”) in exchange for a capital contribution of $3,816,000. On December 30, 2005, the LLC made certain charitable contributions, including two gifts of conservation easements, (one to the Nature Conservancy and the other to the Albemarle County Public Recreational Facilities Authority) and a third gift of a fee interest (to the Nature Conservancy). Under Virginia law in effect at the time, the donor of a conservation easement was entitled to a state charitable tax credit equal to 50% of the fair market value of the property donated. Based on an appraisal undertaken at the time of the gift, the taxpayers were allocated state tax credits totaling roughly $7.4 million. Under the terms of the amended LLC operating agreement, $7.2 million of these credits were allocated to Virginia Conservation. The central tax question in the Route 231, LLC litigation was whether the combined capital
to Virginia Conservation. The central tax question in the Route 231, LLC litigation was whether the combined capital contribution by Virginia Conservation and subsequent allocation of the lion’s share of the tax credits to Virginia Conservation should be treated as a “disguised sale” of the credits under section 707 of Subchapter K. The Tax Court determined that this was indeed a disguised sale and the Fourth Circuit agreed. For present purposes, the relevant aspect of the Route 231, LLC outcome concerns the federal income tax consequences of that sale. That is, once the determination is made that the substance of the transaction is a sale of the credits from Route 231, LLC to Virginia Conservation on December 30, 2005, what are the federal income tax consequences of that sale to Route 231, LLC? We know that the LLC reported that it had made noncash charitable contributions for tax year 2015 in the amount of $14,831,967, representing the full value of the three charitable gifts, undiminished by the $7,415,983 worth of state charitable tax credits granted by Virginia as a result of the gifts. We also know that the IRS did not challenge that return position, but rather took the view that the taxpayer sold tax credits with a zero basis on December 30, 2005. Here again we see the same analysis as applied in the Tempel decision discussed above. Where a donor makes a gift entitling her to a state charitable tax credit: (1) the amount of the federal charitable contribution deduction is the
makes a gift entitling her to a state charitable tax credit: (1) the amount of the federal charitable contribution deduction is the full value of the gift, undiminished by the state tax credits, and (2) any subsequent sale of the credits is treated as a sale of a zero basis asset since the credits are not acquired by purchase but rather result from the unilateral action of the government to confer a lesser tax detriment on the party who has chosen to make the charitable transfer. In summary, this application accords with the Full Deduction Rule expressed in CCA 201105010 and Tempel v. Commissioner. 12
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF STATE CHARITABLE TAX CREDITS SWF Real Estate, LLC v. Commissioner.34 In a separate but virtually identical case, the Tax Court in SWF Real Estate, LLC v. Commissioner addressed the same issues raised in Route 231, LLC. As with Route 231, the taxpayer purchased real estate in Albemarle County, Virginia (Sherwood Farm). Relying on the same Virginia statute (i.e., the Virginia Land Preservation Tax Credit Program), on December 29, 2005 SWF executed a deed of conservation easement conveying the easement to the Albermarle County Public Recreational Facilities Authority, a governmental body of Albermarle County and political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia. According to an appraisal undertaken in early December 2005, the easement had a value of $7,398,333, meaning that its donation to the government would generate state tax credits in the amount of $3,699,167. On its federal income tax return for 2005, the taxpayer reported a noncash charitable contribution of $7,398,333 — i.e., the full amount of the gift, undiminished by the state tax credits generated by the gift. As with Route 231, LLC, the primary question in SWF Real Estate, LLC concerned whether an allocation of the tax credits to a new partner (in fact, the same entity – Virginia Conservation) should be treated as a “disguised sale” under section 707. And as in that prior case, the court determined that there was in fact a disguised sale of the state tax credits to Virginia Conservation. For
case, the court determined that there was in fact a disguised sale of the state tax credits to Virginia Conservation. For present purposes, however, the more relevant holding of SWF Real Estate, LLC concerns the amount of the charitable contribution allowed for 2005. While the taxpayer had claimed a noncash contribution of $7,398,333, the Tax Court considered alternative appraisals and determined that the appropriate amount of the charitable contribution deduction was $7,350,000. While this allowed deduction is slightly lower than the claimed amount, it is noteworthy that the amount of the charitable contribution deduction was not reduced by the state tax credits. Thus, like the prior cases of Tempel and Route 231, LLC, the Tax Court’s holding in SWF Real Estate, LLC once again applied the Full Deduction Rule in determining the amount of the allowable charitable contribution deduction. Maines v. Commissioner.35 One final post-‐CCA 201105010 judicial opinion deserves mention. Although it does not involve charitable contributions, the Tax Court’s decision in Maines v. Commissioner is significant because of its discussion of the federal income tax treatment of state tax credits. The taxpayers in Maines owned interests in an S Corporation and a partnership, both of which had made certain investments in New York entitling them to three state tax credits: the EZ Investment Credit, the EZ Wage Credit, and the QEZE Credit for Real Property Taxes. Eligibility for these credits required investment in certain impoverished
Credit, and the QEZE Credit for Real Property Taxes. Eligibility for these credits required investment in certain impoverished areas designated by the state. While eligibility depended on the entity meeting the investment requirements, the credits passed through to the taxpayers on their individual returns. The EZ Investment Credit, equal to eight percent of certain qualifying 34 T.C. Memo 2015-‐63. 35 144 T.C. 123 (2015). 13
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- Sep 29, 2026
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