Supporting Documentation · Jan 23, 2018
57-18 Exhibit - Urging State of New Jersey to Implement Charitable Trust in Lieu of Local Taxes Plan.pdf
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tax detriment” rather than as a payment from the state. For example, the IRS concluded that the nonrefundable portion of a Minnesota state income tax credit granted to any resident that is or was in active military service should be treated as a reduction in state tax liability rather than a payment from the state.46 Similarly, the IRS concluded that the nonrefundable portion of a Massachusetts state income tax credit granted to certain low-‐income taxpayers who paid real estate taxes or rent should be treated as a reduction in state tax liability rather than as a payment from the state Company v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422 (Ct. Cl. 1971). The tax credits in Winn, and other such cases, were only given to organizations that satisfied extensive state criteria, as the Court clearly understood. Winn, 563 U.S. 130-‐31. If a credit for donations to a state-‐established fund is a problem (and it is not), then why should a credit for donations to a state-‐blessed fund not also be a problem? In both cases, the
m (and it is not), then why should a credit for donations to a state-‐blessed fund not also be a problem? In both cases, the donated resources are directed to services and activities determined by the state. Thus, any claim that state charitable tax credits constitute a quid pro quo only in the case of gifts to public entities is not consistent with current law, and any claim that such credits should be uniquely disfavored does not rest on a solid analytic distinction. Finally, and most crucially, as explained above, federal tax law has addressed this specific issue and has never regarded any tax benefits, either federal or state, and whether in the form of deductions or credits, as a quid pro quo benefit requiring a reduction in the taxpayer’s federal charitable contribution deduction. 45 As explained further below, we have some doubts as to whether that second point is a reasonable conclusion. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s views on this issue are certainly relevant in determining the circumstances when a voluntary gift generating state credits should be regarded as, in substance, the payment of a tax. 46 IRS Chief Counsel Advisory 200708003. 17
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF STATE CHARITABLE TAX CREDITS government.47 In yet another advisory memorandum concerning Massachusetts, the IRS considered the federal income tax consequences of five separate state tax credit programs: (1) Brownfields Tax Credit, (2) Motion Picture Tax Credit, (3) Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit, (4) Low-‐Income Housing Tax Credit, and (5) Medical Device Tax Credit. Here again the IRS recited the longstanding principle discussed above: “The taxpayer that originally receives – that is, qualifies for – one or more of the described credits is not viewed as having received property in a transaction that results in the realization of gross income under § 61. Generally, a state tax credit, to the extent that it can only be applied against the original recipient’s current or future state tax liability, is treated for federal income tax purposes as a reduction or potential reduction in the taxpayer’s state tax liability, not as a payment of cash or property to the taxpayer that is includible in gross income under § 61.”48 In one particularly revealing passage, appearing in the first footnote of CCA 201147024, the IRS observed that “we do not agree that a such a reduction in a taxpayer's potential tax liability is the equivalent of a payment to
at “we do not agree that a such a reduction in a taxpayer's potential tax liability is the equivalent of a payment to the taxpayer…; instead, as stated in the text, in the hands of the taxpayer that originally qualifies for the benefit, it simply enters into the computation of the taxpayer's state or local tax liability and is reflected in the amount of the taxpayer's § 164 deduction.”49 It should be apparent from the discussion above that this italicized passage is not anomalous. Rather, this principle has surfaced repeatedly throughout federal tax law, in a variety of settings, whenever a question relating to state tax credits arises. This is the sense in which the principle is “trans-‐substantive” — i.e., it applies not only in the context of charitable contributions generating state tax credits but in a wide range of other contexts as well. Policy Considerations in Support of the Full Deduction Rule As noted above, the Full Deduction Rule is discussed and supported in cases involving odd fact patterns, such as the sale of tax credits in Tempel, Route 123, LLC or SFW Real Estate, LLC. There are no cases challenging the rule in its common application: when a taxpayer takes a full federal deduction notwithstanding state tax credits that offset some but not 100% of the cost. The rule in that situation appears to be too obvious to be challenged or need defense. The 2011 IRS memo confirms the rule but does not discuss its justification. This is also consistent with a
need defense. The 2011 IRS memo confirms the rule but does not discuss its justification. This is also consistent with a view that the rule is well settled law. We can think of at least three policy considerations underlying the Full Deduction Rule in those circumstances. 47 IRS Chief Counsel Advisory 201423020. 48 IRS Chief Counsel Advisory 201147024. 49 Id. (emphasis added). 18
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF STATE CHARITABLE TAX CREDITS First, the rule reduces arbitrariness and significant computational and administrative difficulties. The most likely alternative rule would limit the deduction by the amount of state tax benefit. Under that rule, the amount of the federal tax charitable deduction would vary from state to state, and vary from taxpayer to taxpayer within each state. This would be arbitrary in itself, and raise practical difficulties for taxpayers and tax agencies. A taxpayer would learn the amount of her federal deduction only by doing simulations at the time of filing; first simulating her state tax liability with the contribution, and then without the contribution. She would not know the amount of her deduction when making the contribution. The simulations would be burdensome and confusing to taxpayers, and the fact that the amount of deduction could not be known at the time of the contribution would create uncertainty that would likely limit contributions. This alternative rule would also be burdensome to the IRS, since it could challenge a deduction only by making similar simulations of the taxpayer's state tax liability. These difficulties would be magnified if states adopted the federal approach, so that state benefits were limited by the federal benefits, just as federal benefits were limited by state benefits. At that point, determining the amount of federal or state benefit would require the use of an algebraic formula that took the
its. At that point, determining the amount of federal or state benefit would require the use of an algebraic formula that took the limitation of both benefits into account. Such a calculation would be beyond the comprehension of all but a few taxpayers or tax preparers. Variants of this alternative rule -‐ such as denying a deduction when the state tax benefit reached a certain point -‐ would require similarly confusing calculations, and have the further disadvantage of arbitrariness, creating a “cliff effect” for taxpayers who fall just short of the acceptable benefit. Second, the Full Deduction Rule is consistent with the fundamental principles that underlie the concept of taxable income. The federal tax laws have historically recognized the entirety of certain state taxes as a deduction. However, federal law has never attempted to go beyond those easily determined figures by inquiring as to whether the internal calculations of state tax liability generates federal taxable income. There is a good reason for this. It is impossible to know whether the combination of rates, deductions, credits and state services a taxpayer receives makes her better or worse off in a way that can be recognized by a concept such as federal taxable income. Theories on which to base taxable income, such as the Haig-‐Simons definition of income, have never been understood to incorporate this determination. The numerous judicial and administrative authorities cited above likewise reflect a judgment not to regard the various credits and
numerous judicial and administrative authorities cited above likewise reflect a judgment not to regard the various credits and deductions allowed in computing state tax liability as producing taxable income. Finally, the Full Deduction Rule is supported by considerations of federalism. State credits in this context are used to stimulate contributions that impact state programs and state residents. For example, the Colorado conservation credits described above put land in the public trust for the benefit of residents (and visitors). Contribution-‐related credits enacted at the state level serve a variety goals, affecting not only the taxpayers who qualify for the credits, but the wider public as well. The Full Deduction Rule is properly neutral toward these state initiatives. 19
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF STATE CHARITABLE TAX CREDITS In some circumstances, states have enacted tax credits that offset 100% of the cost of contributions. That is true with respect to school tuition tax credits adopted in several states, as well as the Cultural Trust credit adopted by Oregon. Currently, these contributions qualify under the Full Deduction Rule. Many of the arguments behind the Full Deduction Rule apply to these credits as well. For example, these credits increase spending in targeted areas, and affect the lives of state residents. These credits would be supported by considerations of federalism. However, other policy considerations in support of Full Deduction might not apply to these credits. For example, a rule that treated these fully offset contributions as the equivalent of a tax would avoid many of the difficult calculation issues described above. (It would, however, create an arbitrary “cliff effect,” as 100% offset contributions were treated as taxes, while other creditable contributions qualify for a deduction of the full amount, undiminished by the value of the credit.) The administrative considerations supporting the Full Deduction Rule in other cases might not apply here. Contributions that offset state taxes on a one-‐to-‐one basis and were not specifically targeted to taxpayer-‐directed areas (such as conservation or education) might also be subject to recharacterization as a tax under common-‐law tax doctrines such as substance over form. In its 2011 advisory memo
e subject to recharacterization as a tax under common-‐law tax doctrines such as substance over form. In its 2011 advisory memo embracing the Full Deduction Rule, the IRS stated “There may be unusual circumstances in which it would be appropriate to recharacterize a payment of cash or property that was, in form, a charitable contribution as, in substance, a satisfaction of tax liability.” 50 We have no way of know what sort of “unusual circumstances” the IRS may have had in mind when it included this passage in its 2011 advisory memorandum. One could imagine the IRS taking the position that state charitable tax credits set to 100% of the amount donated should be treated “as, in substance, a satisfaction of tax liability.” But since the IRS and the courts have consistently allowed a full deduction for charitable contributions, without any reduction for state tax credits, we are left to speculate about what the IRS might have meant. We take no position as to whether the IRS would attempt to challenge a deduction for a contribution that was 100% offset by tax credits, and no position as to whether that challenge would be successful. For state charitable tax credits less than 100%, more difficult line-‐drawing questions arise. There is no clear legal basis for differentiating among state charitable tax credits with varying credit percentages, and treating all charitable tax credits as a quid pro quo, requiring the donor to reduce the amount of their federal deduction by the value of the
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