TFE 81 Northfield Interpretation Request Application Digital Copy 1142416095411

WATERS, MCPHERSON, MCNEILL Diana Chandler-Zimmermann A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION November 4, 2024 Page 7 which the premises are put...”; and 2) “...whether a use is found to be incident to the permitted use is also a customary use”. Generally speaking, “a use which is so necessary or commonly to be expected that it cannot be supposed that the ordinance was intended to prevent it will be found to be acustomary use. The fact that a use is not customarily indulged in, however, is not conclusive, and even if the use in question is found in a small percentage of similar main uses, the use may still be found to be customary”. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court also clarified that even though at times courts have referenced necessity in connection with an accessory use, necessity is not a strict requirement to the fulfillment of a permitted use. Id. at 28, citing United Advertising Cor. V. Metuchen, 42 N.J. at 7 (1964); Wright v. Vogt., 7N.J. 1 (1951), Newark v. Daly, 85 N.J. Super. 555 (App. Div. 1964). Thus, if an example as seemingly outlandish as a helipad for a construction company’s office building can be considered permitted accessory use, it would seem to beyond all doubt that parking a small number of vehicles directly and regularly used by a company leasing and operating office space in a given location both during the day and at night, must therefore be a permitted and sufficiently related accessory use. This is even further underscored when the parking component of such accessory use is already permitted and provided for by the zoning ordinance in question as is the case here. Thus, the analysis at hand is simply whether the “nature” of the parking being contemplated is sufficiently related to the primary office use of the building / property in question, which, when analyzed under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in State v. P.T. & L., seems unquestionable. Similarly, the Appellate Division provided further supportive guidance into determining when a zoning ordinance should be interpreted as permitting something as an accessory use in Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. 202 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 1985), finding that “zoning ordinances which permit ‘customarily incidental’ accessory uses to the main activity permit, by implication, any uses that logic and reason dictate are necessary or expected in conjunction with the principle use of the

ermit ‘customarily incidental’ accessory uses to the main activity permit, by implication, any uses that logic and reason dictate are necessary or expected in conjunction with the principle use of the property.” Id. at 323, citing 6 Powell, Law of Real Property, (1979), para. 869[2][4]. The Court further noted that “an incidental use is one that relates to a business, trade, profession or occupation in general and not specifically to the use which is peculiar to the applicant. Again, in the example presented here, ,there is no question that the proposed accessory parking is directly related to a business operated as of right at the site in question, and thus is clearly permitted under the ordinance. Furthermore, as noted in Shim v. Washington Tp. Planning Bd., 298 N.J. Super 395 (App. Div. 1997) the very nature of an accessory use is that same is implied as permitted under the language of a given zoning ordnance and that it “need not derive from the express terms of the ordinance.” Id. at 401. Parking of vehicles relating to a business that maintains office space is clearly related to that business’ use of a piece of property. By its very nature, determining whether something constitutes an accessory use is a matter of implication and logic as it would be impossible for a legislative body to accurately memorialize in the body of a given zoning ordinance every possible scenario where a supplemental or accessory use is related to a primary use. Rather, as stated by the court in Shim and the other cases cited herein, accessory uses must be interpreted. broadly so as to encompass uses reasonably related to the primary use of a piece of property use contemplated hereunder. #1606835v1