December 10, 2025, Planning Board Special Meeting - WEHI Transcript

omething like that.24 THE PUBLIC: So you testified that this is25 119 basalt and sandstone and at what point along the slope,1 along those homes specifically there, does the basalt2 and sandstone line kind of occur? Do we know where that3 occur's.4 THE WITNESS: It appears to have occurred5 around Langan borings 2 and 4. They didn't encounter6 any basalt in those points and they went to 50-feet deep7 and they were in material that was, that was described8 as being similar to sandstone.9 THE PUBLIC: Around those areas is the rock10 stream stronger or already weakened where they meet?11 THE WITNESS: It becomes flatter and the12 rock becomes weaker, but not critically so.13 THE PUBLIC: Did your report include any14 mitigation measures related to that boundary or where15 that is? I mean, because it's really not -- did you see16 anywhere that it flattened out along those homes there?17 THE WITNESS: You can see from the contours18 that it flattens out ten degrees and less as you get19 further down the slope.20 THE PUBLIC: It flattens out because there's21 homes built there that create it flattened out, doesn't22 the slope end -- we have three or four retaining walls,23 wouldn't it flatten out below those homes to the24 roadway? It's all kind of --25 120 THE WITNESS: I'm talking about the slope1 that's above the retaining walls.2 THE PUBLIC: Okay.3 I don't know, I mean I live there and I4 don't know where I see flat land there, but.5 THE WITNESS: I didn't say flat, I said ten6 degrees.7 THE PUBLIC: Okay.8 Be interesting to see a photograph at some9 point. Did you take any photographs along your walk?10 THE WITNESS: No, I did not.11 THE PUBLIC: Any reason why?12 THE WITNESS: No.13 THE PUBLIC: Okay.14 So the construction activity, you mentioned15 filling in, I guess, not the cracks, I'm sorry, it's16 late. The different, so many different terminology17 being used, but you filling in the slivers or the area18 where water might be going in and around?19 THE WITNESS: If they encountered it.20 THE PUBLIC: What do you call that again,21 I'm sorry. What was name of those areas?22 THE WITNESS: The rock joints.23 THE PUBLIC: The joints, correct. So the24 joints, how would construction, if there are some joints25

31 of 55 sheets Page 121 to 124 of 144 01/14/2026 10:36:25 AM 121 and there's blasting and construction, how, what is the1 magnitude or reach to other joints in that area? So if2 you had to blast some rock or to put in the emergency3 roadway with asphalt or blast or dig or cause vibration,4 how far could those vibrations occur and cause issues?5 Not just directly below Building D but a little on the6 outskirts, what's the likelihood of that?7 THE WITNESS: We recommended, I think, in8 the report that if blasting is done it should be9 controlled and there's a procedure where they, they can10 design the blasting, the way that the explosives, in11 order to limit it, in order to minimize the disturbance12 at a distance. So we recommended that they consider the13 distance to be, the distance to the top of the slope,14 which is only 10 or 15-feet from the line of the15 excavation. So that would, assuming that, that this is16 the type of control that is established, that, that17 blasting would be designed so that the ground motion is18 not severe.19 THE PUBLIC: Severe in terms of, you're20 saying 50-feet 100-feet, so when you're 200-feet away21 would you feel something move or if there was an issue22 going on already in the slope would that be affected?23 THE WITNESS: Well, they use a motion24 criterion. A velocity vibration inches per second. For25 122 instance, if you were blasting for a sewer in a1 residential street you would size it so that the, the2 velocity of the vibration, which they monitor with a3 device, is lower, is lower so that it would not create a4 disturbance.5 THE PUBLIC: So would you recommend to the6 board that a full blasting and vibration impact study be7 required to protect the homes in and around Howell Drive8 and beyond before construction or approval?9 THE PUBLIC: We recommended that a, that an10 earth work, an earth work control plan be submitted11 before construction is approved.12 THE PUBLIC: Is that an earth -- I'm sorry.13 Is an earth work plan different than a basting impact14 study?15 THE WITNESS: No, that would include that.16 THE PUBLIC: Okay. I'm sorry.17 THE WITNESS: Whatever excavation they would18 do they would have to explain, come up with a monitoring19 program to do that. We recommended that they install20 what are called, slope indicators, which measure the21 amount of ground movement and so we recommended they

explain, come up with a monitoring19 program to do that. We recommended that they install20 what are called, slope indicators, which measure the21 amount of ground movement and so we recommended they be22 installed prior to construction and monitored both23 during and after construction to confirm that slope24 movements are not occurring due to the construction.25 123 That was one of the requirements we recommended that the1 board establish.2 THE PUBLIC: So given, I believe that you3 acknowledged that this slope falls into a higher land4 slide prone class, is that correct? Than Langan5 assumed.6 THE WITNESS: No, that's what the -- there7 was a hazard area map, Langan did a subsurface8 investigation of the stability calculation that did not9 indicate that there is instability. So that's, and10 Princeton Hydro also did an analysis and their safety11 factors were pretty much very close.12 THE PUBLIC: You think, I mean I know you13 did some great comparisons and I do thank you for that14 in trying to help this board achieve, but don't you15 think that might have been a little bit better if you16 were just given the full scope to do your independent17 geotechnical verification with the whole works and not18 just numbers and really being out there and really19 digging your own bores where you want to and really20 trying to make heads or tails, because I feel like we21 are just crunching a lot of numbers from an ivory tower22 and wouldn't it be better if you were just given the23 option to do your full own independent report assessment24 and dig where you needed to, to find out what's going on25 124 here?1 THE WITNESS: Well, I am going to say both2 of the engineering firms who did the comments and did3 comments on the slope stability evaluation are4 representable and highly qualified engineering firms.5 THE PUBLIC: Agreed.6 THE WITNESS: I don't know that what we would7 do would add to it.8 THE PUBLIC: But we are still at a point9 where you designate this as a known hazard zone for10 construction?11 THE WITNESS: As a known hazard. No, I12 would not. There are, there have to be precautions13 during construction to not create a situation, but they14 don't appear to exist now based on the calculations that15 were done and the appearance of the site.16 THE PUBLIC: Okay. Thank you.17 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: Thank you.18 THE PUBLIC: Jessica Pearson.19 Mr. Chairman, I have a

xist now based on the calculations that15 were done and the appearance of the site.16 THE PUBLIC: Okay. Thank you.17 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: Thank you.18 THE PUBLIC: Jessica Pearson.19 Mr. Chairman, I have a question for the20 board, just because I don't understand the appearance of21 documents that I don't think were there today, this22 afternoon. Mr. Kleinberg e-mailed a site plan with23 markings and the disappearance of a CME letter on the24 sanitary sewer that was there this morning and now it's25

01/14/2026 10:36:25 AM Page 125 to 128 of 144 32 of 55 sheets 125 not. Can you --1 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: I don't know anything2 about that.3 THE PUBLIC: Can you tell us anything about4 that?5 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: The board wasn't aware.6 Any letters provided today will be provided to the7 objector and the applicant.8 THE PUBLIC: I'm sorry.9 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: The letters that were10 described today, letters that were, the letters that11 were described today will be provided to the objector12 and the applicant by the expert. I don't know anything13 about a CME report that was there this morning and not14 there now.15 MS. McGOVERN: Is it on there?16 MR. PLOCKER: It's on there.17 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: It's on the website, our18 secretary just found it.19 THE PUBLIC: Is it the Mr. Kleinberg site20 plan, letter and e-mail from Mr. Kleinberg?21 MS. McGOVERN: That's O-36 and O-37 was the22 diagram and that should be on there too.23 THE PUBLIC: Yeah, that wasn't there this24 morning.25 126 MS. McGOVERN: Our board secretary is saying1 otherwise.2 THE PUBLIC: I was on there.3 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: We're not arguing with4 you.5 THE PUBLIC: I am simply saying it just6 deals, it's very difficult to follow along with some of7 these meetings where the public has not had, and I am8 sure the board hasn't either, had an ample opportunity9 to review these very important documents.10 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: They're on the website.11 As far as the secretary told us it was on website this12 morning.13 THE PUBLIC: The other question is regarding14 this CME letter, there's references made to documents15 that are not posted, like capacity calculations for16 their sanitary sewer, which are not anywhere on this17 page.18 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: We'll find out.19 THE PUBLIC: I am just saying.20 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: I am saying we'll find21 out.22 THE PUBLIC: There are a lot of missing23 documents and I just, it's very concerning.24 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: The documents you said25 127 missing apparently are there. So providing that1 information may not be as accurate as the public needs2 to hear, so at this moment our secretary will look and3 see if there ar any documents in the CME letter that are4 not there that have been brought to the Planning Board.5 THE PUBLIC: I mean, how can you review6 things and actually think about closing this application7 without the benefit of having the opportunity to hear8 testimony on these very

to the Planning Board.5 THE PUBLIC: I mean, how can you review6 things and actually think about closing this application7 without the benefit of having the opportunity to hear8 testimony on these very important new documents?9 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: We were listening10 previously, we are going to hear testimony based on what11 Mr. Afran said.12 THE PUBLIC: Sorry, say that again, sir.13 You're going to hear testimony on --14 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: We listened earlier, we15 heard the testimony, if needed by the objector will be16 provided at a subsequent meeting.17 THE PUBLIC: What about the applicant?18 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: What about the applicant?19 THE PUBLIC: I mean there's a whole new CME20 letter that there was never any discussion of the21 sanitary sewer in any real way, so my question is, how22 are you getting a review letter and not having CME and23 perhaps the engineer that created the utility plan to24 work out compliance issues and, and the record is not25 128 complete. It says it very clearly in the CME letter.1 So I guess I am saying, you haven't heard any testimony2 on this utility. Zero.3 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: We have. Thank you so4 much for bringing that to our attention. The secretary5 will review it and we'll have our board attorney and I6 look at this.7 THE PUBLIC: Thank you.8 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: Thank you.9 THE PUBLIC: Hi. Susan Pannullo, 200-foot10 notification range. Thank you for all your testimony.11 I am going to ask you a difficult question, a general12 engineering question. When there is a failure, there is13 a disaster and the engineer has chosen the less14 conservative means of evaluating risk versus the more15 conservative means being presented with two divergent16 opinions, engineering opinions from two very good17 engineering firms, when you choose one engineer who18 adjudicates this and chooses the less stringent choice19 and there's disaster, how is that managed? How is that20 dealt with in terms of litigation, in terms of risk to21 the engineer that's made that choice. How does that22 work. Medicine I understand. How does that work in23 engineering?24 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: He didn't testify to that25

33 of 55 sheets Page 129 to 132 of 144 01/14/2026 10:36:25 AM 129 and that's a legal question. So that's above his1 ability to provide that information.2 THE PUBLIC: That would be experience, all3 right. That's his experience. I am not asking him to4 opine about what happens in court, but in your opinion5 as an engineer, in your experience, you're making a6 choice between a more conservative versus a less7 conservative opinion regarding the numbers that are used8 to decide the risk, right. And you're making a choice9 based on that which happens in engineering all the same10 time I'm sure. And I'm asking you in your experience11 when there's a choice between a more conservative and12 less conservative standard and there's a disaster which13 happens, nothings zero risk, which is, you very clearly14 laid out, how is that managed?15 THE WITNESS: I don't quite understand what16 you mean, managed. In other words, if it has a slope17 failure?18 THE PUBLIC: The building comes down, which19 this builder has experienced. If something, if there's20 a disaster, if the O-ring, you know, falls apart on a21 spaceship these are engineering challenges, I teach22 engineering and these are things that you think about in23 medicine, these can cause death. It sounds like that's24 the situation here. And you make choices regarding the25 130 standards that we use to evaluate risk in any situation1 and we very commonly are a third opinion, which you are,2 you are a third opinion when you have an engineering3 group saying one thing and another engineer group saying4 another thing and you have to adjudicate that, you're a5 third opinion as an impartial expert, how is that dealt6 with when there's an error? When there's, you know, a7 flaw in the choice between the less stringent versus the8 more stringent standard.9 THE WITNESS: Well, there would be, you10 know, an investigation. If it was me I would be on the11 carpet and --12 THE PUBLIC: And you feel that, right, I13 guess that's a very simple one, you can feel bad when14 something terrible happens based on the decision?15 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I might be fined or16 jailed, if I was negligent put in jail, which would be a17 terrible thing.18 THE PUBLIC: So thinking about those19 terrible things, what would make an engineer, and I20 really don't know, what would make an engineer make a21 choice to use the less stringent versus a more

ng.18 THE PUBLIC: So thinking about those19 terrible things, what would make an engineer, and I20 really don't know, what would make an engineer make a21 choice to use the less stringent versus a more stringent22 recommendation when evaluating risk in determining, you23 know, what their opinions should be in a situation?24 THE WITNESS: Well, the less stringent25 131 method in this case is the amount of reserve strength1 that you have on the failure surface. In other words,2 based on the recommendation for, for the Princeton Hydro3 may be two times.4 THE PUBLIC: That 1.5 versus 2.0 number,5 right?6 THE WITNESS: And so the one and half7 criteria is generally accepted in the practice as being8 adequate. And to recommend the higher, you know, would9 like to use, you know, the higher coefficient all the10 time but it enables, it imposes large financial burdens11 on people if we over design everything.12 THE PUBLIC: So that's helpful, and I guess13 troubling to me because now what we're doing is talking14 about financial challenges versus evaluating safety.15 Like when is it a good idea to accept a lesser standard?16 THE WITNESS: But these standards are set by17 the standard setting --18 THE PUBLIC: But somebody thinks the19 standard is 2.0 --20 THE WITNESS: -- and in my experience the21 site conditions indicated by the exploration and the22 type of construction on the slope, which there is no23 construction permitted on the slope, there is not --24 does not warrant a safety factor of 2.0.25 132 THE PUBLIC: Are there ever situations where1 it's utilizing a higher standard it becomes untenable,2 unfeasible, unsafe to proceed with a project utilizing a3 more conservative estimate of risk?4 THE WITNESS: Yes, if it was some kind of a5 capital improvement project for a municipality and if6 they had a budget of X million dollars and the bids all7 come in to X, bids come in at 2X then th project doesn't8 go forward. These sorts of things, and if you9 arbitrarily decide to use that to design everything to10 the highest standard and then it's not affordable, then11 it's a problem.12 THE PUBLIC: I will stop in a second, I know13 it's a lot of questions, but when is it ever a worse14 thing in engineering to use a better safety standard15 than a lower safety standard, given the choice provided16 by two expert firms? Like what's the harm, I guess is17 what I am asking. What's

orse14 thing in engineering to use a better safety standard15 than a lower safety standard, given the choice provided16 by two expert firms? Like what's the harm, I guess is17 what I am asking. What's the harm ever in accepting in18 your analysis the more stringent safety standard when19 all things are equal rather than the less stringent20 safety standard?21 THE WITNESS: Well, you can make the stuff22 so large that it's not constructible. Or that it is so23 difficult in construction that you -- it's not24 affordable.25

01/14/2026 10:36:25 AM Page 133 to 136 of 144 34 of 55 sheets 133 THE PUBLIC: Again, we are talking about1 money, I don't want to talk about money at all. I will2 leave this alone. I want to put it out there for maybe3 thought. This is one of those things maybe we all have4 to sleep on but --5 THE WITNESS: And in this instance the6 standards which apply more or less in this case there7 are codes you have to follow. And, and the codes are8 minimus too.9 THE PUBLIC: Thank you so much.10 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.11 THE PUBLIC: No, don't be sorry. This is12 hard. We are here for many, many months going through13 this because this is hard. If it was easy we would have14 been done with this in a few meetings, right. So I15 appreciate your thoughtfulness. Thank you.16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.17 CHAIRMAN BAGOFF: Do any other members have18 questions for Mr. Kleinberg on his testimony? Please19 come up.20 THE PUBLIC: Walter Steinman, Verona.21 You stated that the geology had a basalt top22 and a sandstone base and about 200 million years ago,23 180 years ago and it was Jurassic, so we got fissures24 forming in there. Prior to the glacial period ten25 134 thousand years ago here, you had a tertiary and that1 area eroded. What -- on the slope you had, you have,2 you said you have soil there. Has there been any3 testing on how much smectite and illite is in that soil,4 because that's the weathering material from basalt.5 Illite and smectite are phyllosilicates that are very6 slippery. So if you're going to take all these out and7 waters going to come into this area, you're going to8 have a situation where the slope can slide down to the9 bottom. Has there been any check for the actual10 minerals of the soil?11 THE WITNESS: No, and I am not an expert in12 the subject you're talking about, the chemistry of the13 rock. I am not a geologist. And, and again, in this14 case we looked at the slope on the east side of the15 proposed Building D and that is going to remain wooded16 as it is today, is my understanding.17 THE PUBLIC: But the geology will weigh the18 formation of the two mountains, the Orange formation and19 the Preakness formation were two lava flows that flowed20 out during the Jurassic periods, one came out, flowed21 out just like Iceland. It flowed out underground then22 it stopped, then we had an erosion. So you had all the23 red sandstone come that's iron in the