TFE 81 Northfield Interpretation Request Application Digital Copy 1142416095411

WATERS, MCPHERSON, MCNEILL Diana Chandler-Zimmermann A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION November 4, 2024 Page 6 in an organized and efficient manner, with little to no impact on any other site or individual, in furtherance of the objectives of the MLUL and the Ordinance. Finally, in terms of the character of the neighborhood and surrounding areas, while not directly relevant to the inquiry here as such parking should be permitted as of right under the Ordinance, it is worth nothing there is little to no impact in terms of visual effect, as a majority of the surrounding properties constitute commercial sites, and what limited residential uses are nearby tend to fall in the variety of garden apartment complexes with attendant parking lots (and such lots are filled with cars and vehicles of all types, including a number of commercial vehicles and vans, presumably belonging to residents, that are almost certainly parked by occupants/residents of such apartments, including on an overnight basis). In addition, with respect to the interpretation of the Ordinance posited by the Township in denying Elite’s use it appears that part of the hesitancy of the Zoning department to approve the parking in question here is the fact that building on the Property is an office building that accommodates multiple tenants. It thus logically follows that in the case of a multi-tenant office building, that such building will in fact be occupied by multiple tenants, many, if not all, of whom are likely to be engaged in different lines of business. In case of Elite, there is no doubt that Elite is permitted to occupy the building as its main business offices and to conduct business from the Property. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the proper analysis of the Ordinance with respect to the Property and Elite’s use thereof for example, including the analysis of whether the parking in question here is a permitted accessory parking use, must be confined to and considered, in the context only of that particular tenant and the fact that other permitted users of a site exist should not impact such inquiry. Said another way, and by way of a hypothetical yet illustrative example, if for example, a plumbing company opted to rent office space in the same OB-1 zone as the Property for use as its main business office, but happened to instead lease space in a building only suitable for one tenant,

a plumbing company opted to rent office space in the same OB-1 zone as the Property for use as its main business office, but happened to instead lease space in a building only suitable for one tenant, as opposed to a multi-tenant space, it is highly unlikely that anyone would argue that parking of a plumbing truck overnight at such a location was not a permitted, required accessory parking use. B. External Support for Interpretation of the Ordinance In addition to the support provided above for the interpretation of the Ordinance so as to permit parking of vehicles in the manner proposed by Elite at the Property, New Jersey case law provides further support for the interpretation advanced herein. For example, in State v. P.T. & L. Construction Co., in a wildly different, but appropriately illustrative example, the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately determined that a helipad was a valid accessory use to an applicant’s use of the subject premises as headquarters/primary offices for a construction company, as use of helicopter by company personnel to travel from job sites from the office was part of the company’s essentially routine operations, and thus sufficiently related to the primary use of the premises. 77 N.J. 20 (1978). The Court generally noted that two determinations must be made in determining whether a use is customarily incident to the permitted use of a property (which is directly relevant here as the Ordinance provides that parking in the OB- 1 zone that is required accessory parking is permitted as of right): 1) “whether the use is incidental to the main use: does the use bear a close resemblance and obvious relation to the main use to #1606835v1

WATERS, MCPHERSON, MCNEILL Diana Chandler-Zimmermann A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION November 4, 2024 Page 7 which the premises are put...”; and 2) “...whether a use is found to be incident to the permitted use is also a customary use”. Generally speaking, “a use which is so necessary or commonly to be expected that it cannot be supposed that the ordinance was intended to prevent it will be found to be acustomary use. The fact that a use is not customarily indulged in, however, is not conclusive, and even if the use in question is found in a small percentage of similar main uses, the use may still be found to be customary”. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court also clarified that even though at times courts have referenced necessity in connection with an accessory use, necessity is not a strict requirement to the fulfillment of a permitted use. Id. at 28, citing United Advertising Cor. V. Metuchen, 42 N.J. at 7 (1964); Wright v. Vogt., 7N.J. 1 (1951), Newark v. Daly, 85 N.J. Super. 555 (App. Div. 1964). Thus, if an example as seemingly outlandish as a helipad for a construction company’s office building can be considered permitted accessory use, it would seem to beyond all doubt that parking a small number of vehicles directly and regularly used by a company leasing and operating office space in a given location both during the day and at night, must therefore be a permitted and sufficiently related accessory use. This is even further underscored when the parking component of such accessory use is already permitted and provided for by the zoning ordinance in question as is the case here. Thus, the analysis at hand is simply whether the “nature” of the parking being contemplated is sufficiently related to the primary office use of the building / property in question, which, when analyzed under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in State v. P.T. & L., seems unquestionable. Similarly, the Appellate Division provided further supportive guidance into determining when a zoning ordinance should be interpreted as permitting something as an accessory use in Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. 202 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 1985), finding that “zoning ordinances which permit ‘customarily incidental’ accessory uses to the main activity permit, by implication, any uses that logic and reason dictate are necessary or expected in conjunction with the principle use of the

ermit ‘customarily incidental’ accessory uses to the main activity permit, by implication, any uses that logic and reason dictate are necessary or expected in conjunction with the principle use of the property.” Id. at 323, citing 6 Powell, Law of Real Property, (1979), para. 869[2][4]. The Court further noted that “an incidental use is one that relates to a business, trade, profession or occupation in general and not specifically to the use which is peculiar to the applicant. Again, in the example presented here, ,there is no question that the proposed accessory parking is directly related to a business operated as of right at the site in question, and thus is clearly permitted under the ordinance. Furthermore, as noted in Shim v. Washington Tp. Planning Bd., 298 N.J. Super 395 (App. Div. 1997) the very nature of an accessory use is that same is implied as permitted under the language of a given zoning ordnance and that it “need not derive from the express terms of the ordinance.” Id. at 401. Parking of vehicles relating to a business that maintains office space is clearly related to that business’ use of a piece of property. By its very nature, determining whether something constitutes an accessory use is a matter of implication and logic as it would be impossible for a legislative body to accurately memorialize in the body of a given zoning ordinance every possible scenario where a supplemental or accessory use is related to a primary use. Rather, as stated by the court in Shim and the other cases cited herein, accessory uses must be interpreted. broadly so as to encompass uses reasonably related to the primary use of a piece of property use contemplated hereunder. #1606835v1

WATERS, MCPHERSON, MCNEILL Diana Chandler-Zimmermann A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION November 4, 2024 Page 8 Conclusion NAR therefore respectfully asks the Zoning Board of Adjustment to find and conclude that the parking of a small number of vehicles, including parking such vehicles overnight, by a business that maintains permitted office space at a site in the OB-1 Zone, and which vehicles are directly used in said business’ day to day operations, constitutes permitted required accessory parking as permitted under the Ordinance.. The use is not in conflict with and in line with to other nearby uses. There is nothing in the Ordinance that would require or would justify prohibition of the aforementioned parking use. Relevant case law further supports interpretation of the Ordinance in favor of such proposed use. Very truly yours, WATERS, McPHERSON, MeNEILL, P.C. By: V4. es M. Spdnarkel Enclosures Cc: Applicant (via e-mail w/encl.) Zoning Official (via U.S. mail w/encl.) Board Attorney (via U.S. mail w/encl.) #1606835v1

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Good afternoon We represent Northfield Avenue Realty Associates, LLC, owner of the real property located at 81 Northfield Ave, West Orange, New Jersey (Block 71.01, Lot 43). Please accept this email as requesting certified confirmation from the Tax Collector's Office that all currently due and owing property taxes with respect to this property have been paid in full. Should you have any questions please let us know. Thank you, Jim James M. Spanarkel, Esq. Waters, McPherson, McNeill, P.C. 300 Lighting Way, 7" Floor Secaucus, NJ 07096 Phone: 201-319-5740 Fax: 201-863-2866 js@lawwmm.com FHA RO aiccciacac SAG GS GEES GR ICRC AG OCICIOIOOI ICI IGRI a ak ok oki ia FESS SC SIG aa GG GO Ga RASC Sao GSO Ki a oka ack a ak adda akaek kaa FOCI CIO A RR A HOR - CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE - THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS TRANSMISSION IS ATTORNEY PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY NAMED ABOVE. IF THE READER OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT THE RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS TRANSMISSION IN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY BY TELEPHONE SO THAT WE CAN ARRANGE FOR THE RETURN OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS TO US AT NO COST TO YOU.

WATERS, MCPHERSON, MCNEILL A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ATTORNEYS AT LAW 300 LIGHTING WAY P.O. Box 1560 SECAUCUS, NEW JERSEY 07096 JAMES M. SPANARKEL OFFICE DIRECT DIAL: 201-319-574( MEMBER OF N.J. & N.Y. BARS E-MAIL: jspanarkel@lawwmm.con October 31, 2024 Via Overnight Mail Jacob Nieman Tax Assessor Township of West Orange 66 Main Street, Room 210 West Orange, New Jersey 07052 RE: 81 Northfield Ave, West Orange, New Jersey Block: 71.01, Lot 43 Dear Mr. Nieman: We request that you provide a certified list of property owners located within a two hundred foot radius of property located at 81 Northfield Ave, West Orange, New Jersey (Block: 71.01, Lot 43 on the Official Tax Map of the Township) We have enclosed a return envelope for your convenience as well as our check in the amount of $10.00 in payment of your fee. If possible to also please email a copy of the list that would be greatly appreciated. Thank you for your assistance. Please call me at (201) 319-5740 or e-mail me at js@lawwmm.com should you have any questions or require additional information. Very truly yours, WATERS, McPHERSON, MeNEILL, P.C. BY: OW) mn (/ JamesM. Spanarkel #1609026v1

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Forn W-9 Request for Taxpayer Give Form to the (Rev. December 2014) requester. Do not bs i Treakry Identification Number and Certification send to the IRS. Internal Revenue Service 7 Name (as shown on your income tax return). Name is required on this line; Go not leave this ine blank. Northfield Avenue Realty Associates, LLC 2 Business name/disregarded entity name, f diferent orm above Francine E Tajfel 3 Check appropriate box for tedoral tax classification; check only one of the following seven boxes: 4 Exemptions (codes apply only to iniduaiste proprietor or] C Corporation [J S Corporation [] Partnership [1] Trusvestate eran rete outls coe single-member . C1 Limites liability company. Enter the tax classification (C=C corporation, S=S corporation, P=partnership} > Exempt payee code (any) Print or type See Specific Instructions on page 2. Note. For a si LLG that is disregarded, do not check LLC: check the appropriate box in the ine above far | Exemation fram FATCA reporting the tax classification of the single-mamber owner. code ff any) 1 other (see instructions) > ‘Applies to ocoounts mabilalad outskte the U.S) & Address (number, street, and apt. or suite no.) Raquester’s name and address (optional) 399 Monmouth Street © City, state, and ZIP code East Windsor, NJ 08520 7” Uist account numberis) here (optional Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) Enter your TIN in the appropriate box. The TIN provided must match the name given on line 1 to avoid [Social seourity number backup withholding. For individuals, this is generally your social security number (SSN). However, for a resident alien, sole proprietor, or disregarded entity, see the Part | instructions on page 3. For other - - entities, it is your employer identification number (EIN). Ifyou do not have a number, see How to get a TIN on page 3. =~ = Note. if the account is in more than one nama, see the instructions for line 1 and the chart on page 4 for guidlines on whose number to enter. Part lt Certification Under penalties of perjury, | certify that: 1, The number shown on this form is my correct taxpayer identification number (or | am waiting for 2 number to be issued to me); and 2. 1am not subject to backup withholding because: (a) | am exempt from backup withholding, or (b) | have not been notified by the Intemal Revenue Service (IRS) that | am subject to backup withholding as a result of a